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1 Overview
Steganography is the task of concealing a message within a medium such that the presence of the hidden
message cannot be detected. Though the prospect of steganography is conceivably interesting in many
contexts, and though work has been done both towards formalizing steganographic security and provid-
ing provably secure constructions, little work exists attempting to provide efficient and provably secure
steganographic schemes in specific, useful domains.
Beginning from the starting point of the initial definition of steganographic security, I have engaged in
an exploration which has developed to include two primary tasks, both pointing towards the realization
of efficient and secure steganographic systems in practice: (a) investigating the syntactic and semantic
applicability of the current formalism of steganographic security to a broader range of potentially inter-
esting domains and (b) constructing and implementing provably secure (symmetric-key) steganographic
schemes in domains which are well-suited to the current formalism.
In the remainder of this document, I provide a high-level overview of existing work in the area of provably
secure steganography, and I describe the progress I have made in the tasks stated above. 1
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2 Paper: Understanding Provably Secure Steganography
In 2002, Hopper et. al. published “Provably Secure Steganography,” a work studying steganography from
a complexity-theoretic perspective which set forth the current formal definition of provable steganographic
security [2]. As such, the content of this work is vital to any exploration seeking the realization of provably
secure steganography in practice. What follows in this section is a summary of this work, including the
formal definition of steganographic security which it defines.
In this work, the authors formulate steganography as a game involving three parties: Alice, Bob, and
Ward. In this game, Alice attempts to pass a secret message to Bob, and Ward is attempting to deter-
mine whether or not Alice is sending a secret message.
Towards formally defining security in this setting, the authors abstract communication between Alice
and Bob as occurring over a channel. A channel C, formally, is a statistical distribution on bit sequences
where each bit is marked with monotonically increasing time values: a statistical distribution with support({0,1}, t1)...({0,1}, tn), ∀i, ti+1 ≥ ti 2.
Communication over a channel is an action which requires one or more parties to draw from a channel.
Specifically, the authors assume the existence of an oracle capable of drawing fixed-length bit sequences
from the channel conditioned on a history h of bits already drawn. The authors denote by Ch the channel
distribution conditioned on history h, and the authors denote by Cbh the conditional distribution over the
next b bits (a block) drawn from the channel, again conditioned on h. For any steganographic construction
under this formalism, the authors state that b must be fixed, and the authors require that, for all potential
histories h, the minimum entropy of Cbh be greater than 1.3
The authors define a stegosystem as a pair of probabilistic algorithms S = (SE,SD). SE takes as
input a key K ∈ {0,1}k, a hiddentext m ∈ {0,1}∗, a message history h, and an oracle M(h) which samples
blocks according to Cbh. The result of SEM(h)(K,m,h) should be a sequence of blocks c1 ∣∣ c2 ∣∣ ... ∣∣ cl,
called the stegotext, from the support of Cb∗lh . SD takes as input a key K, a stegotext s, a message history
h, and returns as a result a hiddentext m.
At this point in the work, the authors discuss some of their choices in their formulation of the definition
of a stegosystem. Namely, the authors note that this formalism is constructed under the assumption that
stegosystems do not take advantage of additional knowledge of the channel, resulting in (among other
things) dependence on the use of the channel oracle. The authors also note that this dependence may
not be justified in all cases, as there are reasonable circumstances under which (a) the oracle draws are
not independent or are not efficient (e.g. a human oracle) and/or (b) potentially SD may not practically
have access to an oracle.
Correctness of a stegosystem The authors say that a stegosystem S = (SE,SD) is correct if the
following holds:
∀m, ∣m ∣< p(k) ∶ Pr[SDM(K,SEM(k,m,h), h) =m] ≥ 2
3
Steganographic secrecy with passive wardens The setting for steganographic secrecy against passive
wardens is the following game played by a warden W :
2This definition of a channel is chosen specifically by the authors so as to be able to incorporate the notion of time; this
allows for timing attacks to be included within the formal definition of security.
3Equivalently stated, the block B with maximum probability over the support of Cbh must have Pr[B] < 0.5
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1. W has access to an oracle M(h) which is able to sample blocks from the distribution Cbh for arbitrary
histories h. W is allowed to make as many draws from M(h) as desired.
2. W is given access to a second oracle which is either SE(K,m,h) or a generic oracle O(m,h) which
samples from C ∣SE(K,m,h)∣h . W makes at most q queries to this oracle, totaling l bits of hiddentext.
3. W outputs a bit which signals whether the output of the second oracle contains concealed messages.
In this setting, the advantage of an adversary (warden) against a stegosystem S = (SE,SD) defined
for a particular channel C is
AdvS,C(W ) =∣ PrK,r[WM,SE(K,m,h)r = 1] − Prr[WM,O(m,h)r = 1] ∣
We would then say that a stegosystem is steganographically secret against (t(k), q(k), l(k))− wardens if
the maximum advantage of any warden making q(k) oracle queries totalling at most l(k) bits of hiddentext
and running in time at most t(k) is negligible in k, where k is the security parameter of the system. Here,
the authors attempt to define a notion of universal steganographic secrecy : a stegosystem S = (SE,SD) is
universally stegnanographically secret if, for every channel distribution C having minimum entropy greater
than one and for every probabilistic polynomial time warden W , AdvSC(W ) is negligible in k.
An example construction Hopper et. al. provide multiple constructions which they prove to be
secure in the passive warden model. The first they provide is a stateful scheme which they prove to be
universally steganographically secret conditioned upon the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF).
The scheme provided assumes that Alice and Bob both have access to a channel oracle M(h) and a
synchronizeed d-bit counter and that Alice and Bob have access to a PRF F ∶ {0,1}k×{0,1}d×({0,1}, t)b ⇒{0,1}. Further, the scheme assumes the existence of an error-correcting code able to correct a 3
8
+negl(n)
fraction of errors, the procedures of which are denoted by Enc and Dec. The exact functionality of SE
and SD are given below:
Algorithm 1 Steganographic encoding procedure
1: procedure SE(K ∈ {0,1}k,m′, h)
2: m = Enc(m′)
3: Split m into bits m1 ∣∣m2 ∣∣ ...ml
4: for i from 1 to l do
5: Sample M(h) at most two times until FK(N,M(h)) =mi. Set ci =M(h) for the final sample.
6: Set h = h ∣∣ ci.
7: Increment counter N .
8: end for
9: return c1 ∣∣ ... ∣∣ cl
10: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Steganographic decoding procedure
1: procedure SD(K ∈ {0,1}k, c, h)
2: Split c into b − bit blocks c1 ∣∣ ... ∣∣ cl.
3: for i from 1 to l do
4: Set mi = FK(N, ci).
5: Increment N .
6: end for
7: Set m =mi ∣∣ ... ∣∣ml.
8: return Dec(m)
9: end procedure
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Given the minimal entropy assumption of the channel, the authors are able to succinctly derive an
upper bound on the failure probability (per message) bit of approximately 3
8
, allowing the scheme to be
correct given the use of a satisfactory error correcting code. The authors then show that the stegano-
graphic secrecy of this construction under the passive warden model directly reduces to the PRF security
of F , thereby allowing them to conclude that this scheme S is both correct and universally steganograph-
ically secret.
Other notions The authors addtionally define additional formal notions for steganography, includ-
ing the notion of robust steganography. This definition is an attempt to incorporate the idea of an active
warden who modifies messages as they are sent; however, as the authors admit, an unbounded adversary
may choose to simply replace messages completely from the channel distribution, destroying concealed
messages. Their specific solution is to bound the warden by a relation of permissible modifications, but
the practical relevance of these limitations is not directly clear.
2.1 Initial Thoughts and Questions
“Provably Secure Steganography,” aside from presenting a useful formal framework for defining secure
steganography, coerced from me an initial set of thoughts and questions surrounding the intersection of
provably secure steganography and its realization in practice. In this section, I summarize and discuss
these thoughts and questions.
2.1.1 The Notion of Universal Steganography
The formal model presented by Hopper et. al. explicitly and implicitly portrays some desire to encapsulate
as many potential channels and domains as possible. On this topic, I am left with two questions; namely,
(1) in attempting to achieve such generality, are some domains left out or made more difficult to manipulate
within the framework? and (2) are universal steganographic constructions under this model the most
valuable contribution in practice?
Regarding the first of these questions, clearly the definition of ‘universal’ disqualifies some channels,
given the minimum entropy assumption enforced. Additionally, one result of the generality of the for-
malism is the assumption that the specific characterization of the channel is unknown but that sampling
is feasible: could there potentially be a useful channel where the characterization is known but sampling
many times is not feasible? The reliance on fixed block sizes also seems to add difficulty in domains
where variable-length messages are common: a proof of security for a steganographic scheme within such
a domain would require the added difficulty of proving minimum entropy while dividing messages along
fixed-size block boundaries.
Regarding the second of these questions, consider the simple stateful universal steganographic scheme
given in the original paper. This scheme remains sufficiently general to apply to any channel which, under
the correct choice of b, follows the minimum entropy assumption. In using this scheme, I may achieve
a rate of secrecy of one bit per block. Intuitively, however, it seems that there should exist an optimal
scheme given an arbitrary channel C, even for fixed b, that uses channel-specific properties to achieve a
much better rate.
To illustrate this intuition, say we model the output of Alice as a stochastic process which obeys the
distribution Cbh; when Alice is preparing to send symbol i, there exists some number ri ≤ 2b of potential
symbols she may output while obeying the channel distribution. In theory, then, it seems reasonable to
believe that Alice should be able to hide log2(ri), potentially greater than 1, bits of hiddentext in that
symbol. In the same manner, this specific example provides some motivation to potentially support the
idea that fixing b may not lead to optimal schemes in arbitrary domains, especially ones involving channels
of high entropy which also portray predictable structural properties4.
4Consider the contrived case where the last c < b bits of symbol i may restrict the degree of freedom of symbol i + 1.
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2.1.2 Potential Extensions of the Model
While considering the formalism of the channel in the context of provably secure steganography, a simple
potential generalization occurred to me which I can best describe as n-out-of-k-channel steganography.
There exist heuristic methods of making steganography harder to detect by distributing concealed mes-
sages among multiple mediums. Using this same line of thought, would it be worthwhile to also formalize
a definition of steganographic security (and also constructions) where access to n out of k channels is
required to detect and retrieve concealed messages?
In parallel to the idea of proving the security of steganographic schemes, it also occurred to me that
we might be able to formalize a technique for identifying optimality in secrecy rate for general schemes. 5
3 Exploring Appliciability of the Formalism of Provably Secure
Steganography
Having considered the current formal framework of provably secure steganography as given by Hopper
et. al., I then moved to consider how well this framework directly admits construction of efficient, high-
rate, and provably secure stegosystems in general domains. This section contains a summary of work
I encountered attempting to achieve such a construction, as well as a presentation of my own work to
attempt to modify the formal framework to be more accommodating to such constructions.
3.1 Paper: Variable-length P-Codes
In [3], Tri Van Le attempts to give a somewhat modified paradigm for provably secure steganography, and
he also attempts to introduce a new steganographic primitive, called a P-code, which would allow him to
construct what he calls “essentially optimal” steganographic systems. What follows in this section is a
high-level summary of the components of this work which diverge from [2].
Following some motivation and preliminaries, the author introduces his modified formal framework for
provably secure steganography which is equivalent to that in [2], up to two minor modifications. The first
of these modifications is trivial, in that he introduces new names for the constructs already present in the
framework of Hopper et. al (e.g., “sampler” for oracle, the symbol P to represent the channel, “chosen
hiddentext security” for steganographic secrecy in the presence of passive wardens). The second of these
modifications is more interesting: he models the channel as a statistical distribution over the support of
a finite message space (as opposed to fixed-length blocks of bits). While his definition of advantage does
not incorporate a complexity-theoretic attempt to classify wardens as in [2], this modification seems to
be promising.
Within the bounds of this framework, Le then defines what he calles P-codes. A P-code is a uniquiely
decodable, variable-length decoding scheme Γ = (Γenc,Γdec) where the domain of Γenc is {0,1}n, the range
is the message space of the channel P, and the quantity
∑
c∈{Γe(x)∣x∈{0,1}n} ∣ Prx∼{0,1}n[Γenc(x) = c] − Pr[c]] ∣
is negligible in n.6
We see through later constructions given by Le that the existence of P-codes admits extremely simple
steganographic schemes 7 8. Unfortunately, however, though Le attempts to give a valid P-code derived
5Perhaps this could be done by viewing the output of Alice as a stochastic process as in the previous section.
6Equivalently, that the distribution of Γenc is indistinguishable from the distribution P.
7The example construction by Le implements SE by simply taking the exclusive-or of a hiddentext message and a random
bit string r and then returning the result of encoding this string with Γ.
8In fact, the existence of such a construction would allow ordinary cryptography to be used to arbitrarily construct
steganographic schemes.
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from an arithmetic coding scheme, there seems to be an error in his construction which could introduce
vulnerability in stegosystems which use it. In the first two steps of his Γenc procedure, he does the
following:
1. Initialize a set of variables to be used and set the intial history to be empty.
2. Sample Ch0 l times into c1, ..., cl
This sequence of messages c1, ..., cl is then later output as the first l messages of Γenc. If Alice uses Γenc
as in the example construction of Le, Ward will see l messages which obey the distribution Ch0 , but there
is no guarantee that the sequence cj+1, ..., cl obeys Ch0∣∣c1∣∣...∣∣cj for all j, and so the use of steganography
might be easily detected.
The remainder of [3] concerns itself with applying P-codes to construct public- and private-key stegano-
graphic schemes, as well as proving that P-codes admit “essentially optimal” rates in many cases.
3.2 An Alternative Formalism for Channels with Variable-length Messages
Since the modified framework of provable steganographic security in [3] seemed to address some concerns I
found with the notion of universal steganography from [2], I thought it appropriate to attempt to reconcile
the two frameworks with the goal of obtaining a formalism which is potentially more natural for a wider
variety of domains. This section contains the result of my attempt.
Definition of a channel A channel C is a distribution on messages from a finite message spaceM, parameterized by an associated set of labels τ . In other words, C is a statistical distribution over
support (c1 ∈M, τ1), ...(c∣M∣ ∈M, τn). Note that this definition is a superset of the previous definition, as
we may choose M = {0,1} and define τ such that each τi must contain a time label which is monotonically
increasing among all τi, τj , τk, i < j < k.9
Denote by Ch the channel distribution conditioned on a history h of drawn and parameterized mes-
sages. Further denote by C⇒(i)h the conditional distribution of the next i messages in the channel given
the drawn and parameterized history h. Introduce in addition the notion of the view of a channel: define
the q(n)-view of the next i messages of a channel C conditioned on history h to be the distribution C⇒(i)h
with support restricted to only those i-message sequences whose length in binary representation is less
than q(n) bits; denote such a channel view by C⇒(i)h ∣q(n).
Definition of a (symmetric-key) stegosystem A stegosystem S is a pair of probabilistic algo-
rithms (SE,SD). SE takes as input a key K ∈ {0,1}n, a hiddentext m ∈ {0,1}∗, a history h, and uses an
oracle M capable of samping from C⇒(i)h ∣s(n) (for some i, s(n) defined by the system) to return as output
a sequence of messages c1 ∣∣ ... ∣∣ cl from the support of C⇒(l)h ∣p(n) (where l may vary between hiddentexts
m). SD takes as input a key K, a sequence of messages c1 ∣∣ ... ∣∣ cl, a history h, and an oracle M , and
returns a hiddentext m. Define correctness in a manner similar to the framework of [2].
Steganographic secrecy against passive wardens A passive warden W is a warden which plays
the following game:
1. W is given access to an oracle M(h) which is capable of sampling from C⇒(i)h ∣v(n) given arbitrary
histories h and for some function v(n).
2. W is then given access to one of two oracles:
(a) O0(m,h)⇐ SE(K,m,h)
9τ may yet contain other parameters, e.g. signal strength, such that said parameters may be incorporated into the
definition of a stegosystem.
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(b) or O1(m,h)⇐ C⇒(l)h ∣v(n)
3. W then outputs a bit, representing whether or not he was given O0 or O1.
Denote by (t, q, v(n))-warden a warden which takes at most t steps and q queries having at most a
v(n)-view of the channel while playing this game. In this setting, the advantage of W , Adv(W ), is the
quantity
∣ PrK,r[WM,O1 ⇒ 1] − Prr[WM,O0 ⇒ 1] ∣
Say that a stegosystem S is steganographically secret if the advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-
time warden is negligible in n.
This alternative framework seems to offer three primary benefits over the previous: (1) it is clearly more
natural for modeling channels in domains involving variable-length messages, (2) it offers the capacity to
incorporate elements other than time into stegosystems, and (3) it partially decouples the number of bits
viewed by a warden from the number of messages produced by SE.10
4 Constructing and Implementing Provably Secure Steganogra-
phy in Practice
Though it may be possible to improve upon the formal framework given in [2], the fact remains that, in
reality, the framework it provides is applicable to many domains. As such, I spent time exploring current
applications of provably secure steganography in practice.
There are potentially many motivating reasons to pursue the creation of secure steganographic systems;
consider as a motivating scenario the world of Alice, Bob, and Ward, where Ward has a large degree of
control of Alice and Bob. What if Ward is, say, a nation-state government who has outlawed encryption?
What if Ward institutes a strict key disclosure law, where all keys used by Alice and Bob to communicate
must be disclosed upon request? Steganography immediately becomes relevant in these situations as a
means for Alice and Bob to communicate confidentially.
Of course, in such a situation, the utility of steganographic systems is linked to the channels over
which they operate. In a scenario akin to the ones given, Ward will have a vested interest in disallowing
steganography: even if a system exhibits a provable 0% detection rate, Ward may simply outlaw the
medium used. For this reason, we would reasonably conclude that a steganographic system operating
over an outdated landline phone protocol would be significantly less useful than a system which uses the
English language as a medium; more generally, one might say that the value of a steganographic system
directly correlates with the indispensability of the underlying channel.
With this idea in mind, I began to consider what vital technologies might also serve as suitable
steganographic mediums. In beginning this search, I noted two things: (1) that computer networking is
ubiquitous and fundamental to the function of the modern world, and (2) that secure computer networking
is ubiquitous and fundamental to the function of the modern world. While exploring existing work
attempting to use networking protocols as steganographic channels, I found that nearly no work attempts
to provide constructions within any framework of provably secure steganography. In considering (2), I
realized that there is one common aspect to virtually every secure networking protocol which also lends
itself very well towards the formal steganographic model of [2]: cryptographic primitives and cryptographic
protocols 11.
This section summarizes existing work I encountered while considering the use of networking protocols
as a steganographic medium and presents my own work in using randomness in cryptography to design
and implement practical steganographic schemes.
10In practice, such a coupling could result in the proof derived within a framework not being sound in that the system
proved secure actually has a vulnerability.
11specifically the uniform randomness used by cryptographic primitives and protocols
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4.1 Paper: HICCUPS, Network Steganography at the Link Layer
HICCUPS is a system presented by Szczypiorski [5] which attempts to use the data link layer to implement
a steganographic system. This system is included in this report as an example of a typical steganographic
system in practice which provides no rigorous guarantee of secrecy: the entire premise of the system is
the use of intentionally incorrect values in integrity fields (e.g. checksum fields), a technique whose use
may be trivially detected by simply verifying the correctness of included checksums.
There may be some use in the method in highly unreliable networks; however, as the transmission
probability decreases, so does the plausibility of faking transmission errors, but, in the case of this system,
there is yet no proof that the distribution of errors induced in the checksum will match the distribution of
natural errors induced within the network. Further, the use of this method arbitrarily in a network may
lead to ‘hubs’ of slightly increased transmission error probability centered around the nodes employing it,
providing yet another possibility for detection which has not been addressed.
4.2 Paper: Murdoch and Lewis, Network Steganography at the Internet/Transport
Layer
Diverging somewhat from the methods of the previously discussed paper, in “Embedding Covert Chan-
nels in TCP/IP” [4], Steven Murdoch and Stephen Lewis present an overview of common approaches
to achieving steganography in the TCP/IP networking layer, concluding that most existing approaches
are vulnerable in practice. While their approach does not make use of the formal framework of provable
steganography, they raise multiple concerns which relate closely.
The authors begin with an overview of current approaches in TCP/IP steganography, stating that most
existing proposals result in output distributions different from the distribution expected from ordinary
TCP/IP. As is the case for steganography at the link layer, TCP/IP steganography proposals attempt to
hide information in the header fields of packets as they are constructed. The authors discuss the fields
that are most commonly used, listed below:
IP Header Fields IP is a common Internet-layer protocol responsible for addressing and host-to-host
routing of packets. The following headers are commonly incorporated into IP steganography proposals:
1. Type of Service The ToS field is an 8-bit field which is commonly unused. Most platforms will, by
default, set the ToS field to zero; thus, any use will be easily detected.
2. IP Identification (IPID) The IPID is a 16-bit identifier for datagrams used during the fragmentation
process. Though meant to be unpredictable, the IPID field is not random on most platforms, instead
being a number generated by a predictable deterministic process depending on the host platform.
There exist steganographic proposals for this field which replace the IPID with pseudo-random
numbers; however, the authors indicate that such a method is easily detected, as the IPID is not
random.
3. IP Flags The (two) flags used in IP packets have a well-defined meaning; steganographic use would,
aside from potentially inducing undefined network behavior, be easily detected.
4. IP Fragment Offset When packets are fragmented, this field is used to reconstruct the original
packet. The authors indicate that there exist steganographic proposals which convey information by
modulating packet sizes; however, this is detectable within many networks where such fragmentation
is unusual.
TCP Header Fields TCP is a common transport-layer protocol responsible for connection-oriented,
reliable host-to-host communication on top of the IP protocol. The following headers are commonly
incorporated into TCP steganography proposals:
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1. Sequence Number The sequence number of a TCP packet is a 32-bit number which numbers the
packets sent in a TCP connection. Since the relationship between subsequent sequence numbers
is determined, there only exists a degree of freedom in the choihce of the Initial Sequence Number
(ISN). These numbers are chosen carefully to enforce uniqueness and overlap constraints; however,
existing proposals either replace the ISN with the hiddentext or encrypt the hiddentext (using e.g.
DES) and include it as the ISN. In practice, however, such a choice of ISN does not follow the
platform-dependent ISN selection method and is therefore easily detected.
2. Timestamp The timestamp field is a header field (technically two 32-bit header fields) used by some
platforms (in some situations) to measure round-trip latency. Use of this field for steganographic
purposes is detectable in many cases by nature of the fact that many platforms no longer use the
field; additionally, use of the field in existing proposals differs from the expected distribution.
In the remainder of the paper, the authors explore in detail the platform-dependent mechanisms which
determine the previously discussed fields. Further, they develop a suite of exhaustive tests which are used
to detect uses of these fields for steganographic purposes (noting the previous proposals which failed these
tests). Using these tests, the authors construct a steganographic suite called Lathra which is able to avoid
detection in this model on OpenBSD and Linux platforms.
This work by Murdoch and Lewis emphasizes the trend in practical work in steganography to neglect
to provide rigorous guarantees of securitiy; even more, this work reveals the extreme difficulty in con-
structing useful, secure steganographic schemes in the face of platforms which do not always obey protocol
specifications.
4.3 Embedding Steganography within Cryptographic Primitives and Proto-
cols
[5] and [4] illustrated the difficulty which exists in using base networking protocols as steganographic
channels: the varied (yet predictable) tendencies of their implementations to diverge from their specifica-
tions. As a result, the underlying channel distribution is less easily characterized and less amenable to the
framework and constructions of [2], all the while not admitting much prospect for high-rate steganographic
schemes.12
Not all network functionality is as forgiving of breaches of specification; among such functionalities
are secure networking protocols, used ubiquitously to guarantee the confidentiality and safety of systems,
people, and governments alike. Since their removal would cause modern businesses to halt, banks to
fail, and potentially lives to be lost, secure networking protocols certainly seem to meet the threshold of
indispensability. Even more promising, these protocols also share a common denominator which must be
implemented properly and which frequently makes use of randomness: cryptography.
In this section, I present my work on the use of cryptographic constructions used in secure networking
protocols to create steganographic channels. I first give and prove the security of a simple stegosystem
which operates over the initialization vectors of ciphers operating in CBC mode; I then present a system
which implements this scheme and my work to integrate it into OpenSSL as a real-world steganographic
application; finally, I present initial work I have performed to design stegosystems utilizing primitives in
elliptic curve cryptography as steganographic channels.
4.3.1 Steganography among Initialization Vectors in TLS 1.2/AES-CBC
TLS (Transport Layer Security) is one of the most pervasive modern cryptographic protocols, used to
provide confidentiality, integrity, and source verification in addition to reliable transport. One of the most
well-known applications of TLS is the HTTPS protocol, used to secure standard web traffic.
12These methods tend to rely on header fields, usually less than 6% of total packet size and consisting primarily of heavily
determined, low-entropy fields.
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The TLS protocol specification exhibits a high degree of structure, itself being composed of a set of
sub-protocols: the handshaking protocol, the cipher agreement protocol, and the application data protocol
[1]. It is in this third sub-protocol, the application data protocol, that secured data transfer takes place;
owing also to the structure of TLS, all data transferred through the application data protocol must pass
through a single well-defined set of functionalities, the record layer, which determines how confidentiality
and integrity guarantees are enforced [1].
As one might imagine, TLS guarantees confidentiality of data at the record layer through the use of
encryption. However, as the length of data handled by TLS is not guaranteed to fit into a single block
for a given cipher specification, TLS necessarily employs ciphers in a variable-length mode of operation.
Conveniently, the latest non-draft specification for TLS, TLS 1.2, prefers the use of AES in CBC mode,
and the specification states that initialization vectors (IVs) must be uniformly random and unpredictable
per-IV [1] 13.
Given that IVs must be random, the channel distribution that would correspond to the sequence of
IVs seen during a sequence of TLS 1.2 connections is both well-defined and well-suited to the develop-
ment of a stegosystem that achieves a rate of secrecy greater than one bit per block. In this section, I
provide a simple stateful symmetric-key stegosystem for the IVs of TLS 1.2/AES-CBC and a proof of its
steganographic secrecy within the framework of [2].
A stegosystem for TLS 1.2/AES-CBC Let F (K,x) be a secure pseudo-random permutation
F ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}b ⇒ {0,1}b. Let N be a synchronized counter shared between Alice (the holder of
the secret) and Bob (the receiver of the secret), initialized to 0. Take b as both the block size for S and
the IV size of the cipher. Because initialization vectors are chosen uniformly at random in TLS 1.2/AES-
CBC, we have that the conditional channel distribution Cbh is the uniform distribution over support {0,1}b
for all histories h. We define the following stegosystem S = (SE,SD):
Algorithm 3 Steganographic encoding procedure
1: procedure SE(K ∈ {0,1}n,m,h)
2: Split m into r-bit blocks m1, ...,mk.
3: for i from 1 to k do
4: Increment N .
5: yield F (K,N)⊕mi
6: end for
7: end procedure
Algorithm 4 Steganographic decoding procedure
1: procedure SD(K ∈ {0,1}n, c1 ∣∣ ... ∣∣ cl, h)
2: for i from 1 to l do
3: Increment N .
4: yield F (K,N)⊕ ci
5: end for
6: end procedure
Note in the above scheme that I use the term yield rather than return. This is simply done to induce
the timestamp parameter of the bits in any stegotext block c to match the timestamp of the would-be
innocent initialization vector.
Proof of Steganographic Secrecy This proof makes use of the well-known result that the advan-
tage of a secure PRP F (K ∈ {0,1}n, x ∈X = {0,1}b) is negligible in the PRF setting with q queries if q2∣X ∣
13This was at least the case until recently; due to timing attacks on CBC, recent proposals have proposed to drop support
for CBC entirely in TLS 1.3, and most TLS 1.2 implementations default to GCM.
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is negligible.
Claim S is steganographically secret against any probabilistic polynomial-time warden when n = b.
Say that there exists a (t(n), q(n), l(n))-warden W which achieves non-negligible advantage in the game
for steganographic security given in [2] where t(n), q(n), and l(n) are polynomials in n. In other words,
that the quantity
AdvS,C(W ) =∣ PrK,r[WM,SE(K,m,h)r = 1] − Prr[WM,O(m,h)r = 1] ∣
is non-negligible for this warden. In the steganographic secrecy setting, consider a party A which
simulates either SE(K,m,h) or O(m,h) by playing the PRF security game as follows:
1. The broker flips a single coin r. If r = 1, the broker chooses a key K ∈ {0,1}n for F . Else, the broker
chooses a truly random function F ′.
2. A initializes a counter N to 1.
3. A then waits for a queries from W . On query m, A queries the broker with N and obtains v =
F (K,N) or v = F ′(N). A then responds to W with v ⊕m and then increments N .
4. Once W outputs a guess, A forwards this as its guess to the broker.
Note that, in the third step, if r = 1, the response to A is precisely the value of SE(K,m,h); if r = 0,
the response to A is random, since v = F ′(N) is random, and therefore a simulation of O(m,h) given our
characterization of Ch. Since A makes as many queries as W and as much time as W to output a guess,
we know that A is polynomial both in time taken and queries made.
Consider the quantity ∣ Pr[A ⇒ 1 ∣ r = 1] − Pr[A ⇒ 1 ∣ r = 0] ∣; this is the advantage of A in the
PRF security game against F . The value Pr[A⇒ 1 ∣ r = 1] is precisely the probability that the warden
outputs 1 given that SE(K,m,h) is being simulated; the value Pr[A ⇒ 1 ∣ r = 0] is precisely the value
that O(m,h) is being simulated. Therefore, the advantage of A in the PRF security game is exactly
the advantage of W in the setting for steganographic secrecy; thus, if W has non-negligible advantage
against S = (SE,SD), then A has non-negligible advantage against F in the PRF security game. This
directly contradicts our choice of F : by the previously stated result, we know that the advantage of any
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary is < q(n)2
2n
when b = n, therefore negligible.
Taking n = b = 128, the IV size for AES, we conclude that S is steganographically secret against all
probabilistic polynomial-time wardens in our application (and that therefore the probability of detection
is less than poly(128)
2128
) 14.
4.3.1.1 Steg-MQ, a Steganographic Message Queue Having designed and proved a stegosystem
suitable for use in TLS 1.2, I next endeavored to integrate it into a real-world application. I completed
this task in two steps: (1) implementation of a steganographic message queue and (2) modification of the
OpenSSL implementation of TLS (version 1.1.1) to integrate the change.
Towards (1), I implemented a system called Steg-MQ. Steg-MQ is a steganographic message queue:
in other words, it’s a process which runs on a machine and provides the following functionality to other
processes:
1. The ability to publish data to be hidden according to a channel distribution and steganographic
scheme. Published stegotexts are stored into one of multiple stegotext queues, each designated for
use by a specific application which handles the transmission of the stegotext.
14In practice, then, we would probably want to switch keys after many uses of SE.
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2. The ability to consume and retrieve channel messages that have been published into an application’s
stegotext queue (ideally to then be sent by the application).
3. The ability to decode incoming stegotexts and publish them into one of multiple application-specific
hiddentext queues.
4. The ability to retrieve and consume decoded hiddenteexts from an application’s hiddentext queue.
Systems like Steg-MQ are necessary for the practical of implementation in practice. While stegosystems
may be sound in theoretical formulation, real-time transmission of the output of SE requires available
cover (e.g., a packet being sent via TLS). Another practical area of concern is duplication of implementa-
tion; by centralizing the implementation of steganographic operations to a single service, we can reduce
inevitable error that would occur from multiple applications independently implementing them.
The current rudimentary form of Steg-MQ (implementing only publish and consume for a single global
queue and for only the channel distribution and stegosystem defined in this section) may be found on
GitHub (https://github.com/ad-alston/steg-mq).
After implementing the proposed stegosystem within Steg-MQ, and after implementing a simple dy-
namic library that may be used by any application to interface with Steg-MQ, integration required
only a minimal change to the OpenSSL implementation of TLS (which may also be found on GitHub:
https://github.com/ad-alston/openssl-steganography). The interaction between Steg-MQ and OpenSSL’s
implementation of TLS 1.2 is depicted in the following sequence diagram:
Figure 1: Sequence Diagram for Steg-MQ and OpenSSL
4.3.2 Steganography among Elliptic Curves
After designing and implementing a steganographic system that operates over channels of initialization
vectors, I began to explore the use of other cryptographic primitives as steganographic channels. Most
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recently, I have been exploring the possible use of ephemeral-key elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman exchanges
and the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm to this end. This section presents a high-level overview
of the approaches I have been considering.
4.3.2.1 Ephemeral-key Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm Say that Alice and Bob are preparing to perform an ephemeral-key elliptic curve Diffie-
Hellman exchange for a curve whose domain parameters include a generator G of order n. I present
a stateful stegosystem S = (SE,SD) which operates on a channel distribution C over ephemeral keys
generated within this domain. Let F (K,x) be a PRP {0,1}k ×{0,1}n ⇒ {0,1}n and HK(K,x) be a PRP{0,1}k × {0,1}r ⇒ {0,1}r. Let N be a synchronized counter set to 0.
Algorithm 5 Steganographic encoding procedure for ECDH
1: procedure SE(K ∈ {0,1}n,m,h)
2: Split m into r-bit blocks m1, ...,mk.
3: for i from 1 to k do
4: Set d = d(H(K,mi)), where d(j) = F (K,N + j).
5: yield (d, dG)
6: Increment N .
7: end for
8: end procedure
Algorithm 6 Steganographic decoding procedure for ECDH
1: procedure SD(K ∈ {0,1}n, c, h)
2: Enumerate d(j) = F (K,N + j) until d(j)G = c.
3: If no such j found, quit.
4: return H−1(K, j).
5: Increment N .
6: end procedure
Note that the above procedure allows the transfer of r bits of transformation per elliptic curve com-
municated. In the context of ECDH, the scheme would be applied as follows:
1. Alice, wanting to communicate an r-bit message, computes her ephemeral key as SE(K,m) =(dA,QA).
2. Bob generates his ephemeral key as usual (or uses SE himself with another key and counter).
3. Alice sends Bob her ephemeral public key QA.
4. Bob runs SD(K,QA) and obtains the message.
5. Alice and Bob complete ECDH as usual.
No direct proof of secrecy is given (for the sake of the length of this document); however, the intuition
behind such a proof would be that, as dA should be pseudo-random, the distribution over the public
component of the public key should be indistinguishable from the innocent case.
Since an explicit enumeration of 2r values is required, in practice, such a scheme may only ever be
implemented with r of 10-15 (with precomputation and other clever implementation tricks). This may
still prove useful, however: consider a generic web service which runs on HTTPS and experiences 10-20
requests per second. Such a web service may be able to covertly communicate megabytes of information
per day by means of ECDH alone. Such a rate of secrecy would additionally be more than enough for
two parties to establish a covert key for future communication in, say, 3-4 connections.
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I also note that the above approach is also relevant to the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
(ECDSA) by a similar application.
A note on ECDSA If it can be shown that the distribution of the x-coordinates of points P = dG where
d is chosen uniformly at random is itself uniformly random 15, one may obtain a higher rate of secrecy by
simply obtaining random curve points as follows:
1. Apply a PRP to hide message m (whose length in bits is equal to that of the x-coordinate of points
on this curve).
2. Obtain the y-coordinate by solving the proper quadratic equation. (If there is no point for the chosen
x, modify the scheme by using the last k bits of the message as padding and increment through all
2k padding values until the point is valid.)
5 Conclusion and Next Steps
Over the course of this project, I have explored publications relating to the semantic definition of prov-
ably secure steganography, and I have surveyed available work on implementing efficient provably secure
steganography in practice. As a result of this investigation, I myself devised and presented a natural mod-
ification to the formal framework of provably secure steganography, and I have designed and implemented
provably secure steganographic constructions in a highly relevant real-world context to address the lack
of such systems in practice.
The continuation of this work would rest in considering all of the points considered in greater depth,
in so doing addressing one or all of the following ideas:
The formal framework of provably secure steganography: Is there a natural and useful do-
main where all of the frameworks given in this paper are not sound or are exceedingly cumbersome? Is
there some domain where one is and one is not? Is there some way to formalize a measure of optimality
of rate based upon a stochastic model of communication?
Extensions of steganography: Where might a construction of n-out-of-k-channel steganography be
useful? An ambitious goal may be to give a construction of n-k steganography in this domain.
Steganography in practice: Further substantiate the implementation of Steg-MQ. Implement the
scheme for elliptic curve steganography within Steg-MQ and augment OpenSSL to use it. Use Steg-MQ
to integrate one of these schemes (potentially the scheme for ECDSA) in another application (potentially
a blockchain technology).
Cryptography as a channel: Investigate other opportunities to take advantage of randomness in
cryptographic primitives for the sake of steganography; explore the truth behind relevant questions (such
as the one regarding the distribution of x-coordinates: is this true in some curves?).
More ambitious channels for steganography: Find more ambitious channels that don’t rely so
much on uniform randomness. Attempt to develop and implement a provably secure stegosystem which
uses something like web technologies, mark-up languages, program execution patterns, or even natural
language as a steganographic channel.
15I admit that this may simply not be the case for some or any curves.
Page 14
Steganography Project Report, Fall 2016
Aubrey Alston (ada2145@columbia.edu)
References
[1] Dierks, T., and Rescorla, E. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2. RFC
5246 (Proposed Standard), Aug. 2008. Updated by RFCs 5746, 5878, 6176.
[2] Hopper, N. J., Langford, J., and Ahn, L. v. Provably secure steganography. In Proceedings of
the 22Nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology (London, UK, UK,
2002), CRYPTO ’02, Springer-Verlag, pp. 77–92.
[3] Le, T. V. Efficient provably secure public key steganography. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2003, 2003. URL: https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/156.pdf/.
[4] Murdoch, S. J., and Lewis, S. Embedding Covert Channels into TCP/IP. Springer Berlin Heidel-
berg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005, pp. 247–261.
[5] Szczypiorski, K. A performance analysis of hiccups–a steganographic system for wlan. Telecommun.
Syst. 49, 2 (Feb. 2012), 255–259.
Page 15
